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Introduction 
Within the first two decades of its existence, the newly designed institutions of the Fifth 
Republic did progressively bring about a much more stable pattern of ‘bipolar 
multipartism’ than had been characteristic of the Fourth Republic. The existence of two 
antagonistically related ideological camps, however, was dependent on the close 
association of the two major lines of cleavage, pitting against each other a secular-
socialist/communist and a Catholic-anti-communist subculture. Since the late 1970s, 
however, the party system has been transformed in significant ways. The balance of 
power among the main left-wing and right-wing parties has changed. The Communist 
party and the UDF have lost ground to the Socialists and to the RPR, respectively. 
Then, starting in the mid or late 1980s, the traditional pattern of opposition between the 
left-wing and right-wing blocs has also been altered by the electoral gains of the Front 
National. This party has appeared as a powerful new actor on the political space, giving 
rise to a ‘tripolar’ pattern of party competition. Finally, the fragmentation of the party 
system has also increased, at least temporarily, within the traditional left-wing and 
right-wing ideological blocs. Although no single explanation can account for the this 
phenomenon, we claim that the fragmentation of the party system is at least to some 
degree related to the emergence of new conflicts that fit uneasily in the traditional 
structure of oppositions represented in the party system.  
We argue in this paper that these developments are consequences of a more general 
transformation process in West European democracies. As shown by Kriesi et al. (2006; 
2008), globalization and the process of European integration lead to the emergence of a 
new structural conflict at the national level.1 A new divide can be observed in several 
democracies, opposing those who benefit from the opening up of borders to those who 
feel threatened by the economic, cultural, and political integration. While the former 
support further international integration, the latter groups of citizens defend national 
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boundaries, in a strategy of demarcation. In the process, new issues, such as European 
integration and immigration become more salient and are integrated into the traditional 
lines of cleavage. In general, the parties who appeal to the preferences of the ‘losers’ of 
globalization constitute the driving force of this transformation of the party system. As 
one of the oldest right-wing populist parties, the Front National has been among the first 
to adopt a discourse of ‘differentialist nativism’, which stresses the need to preserve 
distinct national traditions (Betz 2004, see also Rydgren 2005). Earlier than in other 
countries, the electoral success of the populist right in France has set in motion the 
transformation of the dimensional structure and the repositioning of the established 
parties within the transforming structure. The redefinition of cultural conflicts as well as 
the emergence of the issue of European integration on the political agenda has produced 
far-reaching changes in the structure of oppositions in the French party system. 
While this conflict between ‘integration’ and ‘demarcation’ is not a French 
idiosyncrasy, its impact on the political space and party system has been conditioned in 
part by the institutions of the Fifth Republic. The two-round majoritarian system 
employed since 1958 has not impeded this evolution, because it creates weaker 
incentives than a pure majoritarian system for voters to desert candidates with no real 
chances of winning the election (see Blais and Loewen, this issue). The strategies 
pursued by the mainstream right in shaping the articulation of the new cultural division 
between integration and demarcation have also played an important role. In many ways, 
the RPR has paved the way for the later success of the Front National by first putting 
cultural protectionism on the political agenda in the 1970s and early 1980s, and then 
moving closer to the political centre thereafter. In particular, the convergence of the 
established right with the parties of the left on a pro-integrationist stance in the 2002 
election seems to have boosted the populist right’s electoral fortunes. 
 4
In this paper, we analyze the transformation of the French political space and the 
strategic positioning of parties within it by focusing on parties’ issue positions during 
electoral campaigns. Our data come from content analyses of the newspaper coverage of 
election campaigns in 1978, 1988, 1995, and 2002 (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008). Based on 
this data, the main dimensions structuring the political space and the party positions 
within this space are determined using multidimensional scaling. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We first review the changes in the 
electoral strength of the various parties and ideological groupings since the new 
institutions of the Fifth Republic have been put into place in 1958. Then we discuss in 
more detail our hypothesis on how globalization affects the main dimensions structuring 
party positions, and how these developments may explain some of the observed changes 
in party strengths. In the following section, we introduce the dataset and methods used 
for our empirical analysis. Next comes the presentation of the corresponding empirical 
results. In the discussion of these results and of the transformation of the party system 
associated with globalization, we pay particular attention to the mediating role of the 
electoral system and to the consequences of party strategies. Finally, we conclude by 
discussing how Nicolas Sarkozy’s partial appropriation of the right-wing populist 
agenda in the 2007 election may have impinged on Jean-Marie Le Pen’s meagre 
showing in those elections. By assessing how durable the Front National’s presence in 
the French party system is likely to be, we derive predictions on whether the 
configuration of political parties is likely to remain tripolar, or if a bipolar pattern of 
oppositions is likely to re-emerge after the transformation of the political space is 
consolidated. 
 
From bipolar multipartism to tripolar competition 
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In the years after 1958, the two-round majoritarian formula used in presidential and 
parliamentary elections at the national level brought about a more stable pattern of 
‘bipolar pluralism’ (Parodi 1989; Knapp 2002) than the fragmented party system of the 
Fourth Republic had known. Progressively, the various parties of the non-Gaullist right 
merged into a federation of parties under Valéry Giscard d’Estaings leadership, leading 
to the establishment of the UDF in 1978. At the same time, Jacques Chirac’s newly 
founded Gaullist RPR firmly institutionalized itself and progressively gained weight 
within the right after 1976. With the left dominated by the Communists on the one hand 
and François Mitterrand’s re-launched Socialist party on the other, the 1970s saw an 
institutionalization of the party system. As a result of the electoral rules, a bipolar 
pattern of opposition emerged, where both major parties within each block joined 
together to support a candidate of the left or the right, respectively, in the second round 
of the Presidential elections (Parodi 1989). 
The evolution of the vote shares of the major parties is presented in Figure 1, for the 
legislative elections, and in Figure 2 for the presidential contests.2 Actually, these 
figures show a simplified version of this story, by grouping together from the beginning 
the various parties and movements that have later resulted in the formation of the PS, 
the UDF, and the RPR (later UMP). Only the PC already existed at the beginning of the 
Fifth Republic. The other three main parties were created after a complex series of splits 
and alliances, and numerous changes of names. By focusing on the five main parties or 
party groups, however, we can identify more easily some significant changes in the 
balance of power and the cleavages underlying party divisions. Among left-wing 
parties, we see that the Communists had a slight electoral advantage over the PS in 
legislative elections, until the late 1970s. In this period, the PC also won a larger vote 
share in the 1969 presidential elections, where candidates of both the communist and 
non-communist left were running. With the 1978 legislative and 1981 presidential 
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elections, however, the balance shifted in a dramatic way. The PC has continuously lost 
ground since then, while the PS ended at the first or second overall rank in all but two 
subsequent elections. 
 
‘Figure 1 about here’ 
‘Figure 2 about here’ 
 
The balance of power has also changed among right-wing parties. The Gaullists largely 
dominated the legislative and presidential elections of the 1960s, during de Gaulle’s 
presidency. In the 1970s, on the other hand, the UDF and RPR (or their forerunners) 
were of about equal strength in legislative elections. In the presidential contests, Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing fared significantly better than the Gaullists Jacques Chaban-Delmas 
and Jacques Chirac in 1974 and 1981, respectively. From the 1988 election onwards, 
however, the RPR (or UMP) clearly took the upper hand first in the presidential 
elections, and more recently also in parliamentary elections. 
Up to the mid 1980s, thus, the political landscape was dominated by two parties or 
party groups on the left and two on the right. Electoral competition was mainly 
structured by a left-right dimension, opposing the PC and PS, on the one hand, to the 
UDF and RPR, on the other. Most important, this left-right dimension corresponded to 
both the religious and class cleavages. Citizens’ attitudes and party preferences were 
strongly related to their social class and to their degree of religiosity (Boy and Mayer 
1997; Mayer and Schweisguth 1989; Michelat and Simon 1989). This conferred a high 
degree of stability to the pattern of bipolar multipartism characteristic of this period – at 
least as long as the traditional cleavages of class and religion were salient. 
However, in the last two decades, the dominance of these four party groups has been 
called into question. Since the mid 1980s, the FN has emerged as an important new 
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force on the electoral stage. In addition, we observed more recently a trend toward a 
higher level of fragmentation, with a strengthening of the Greens and of parties of the 
radical left, and a multiplication of the number of candidates in presidential elections. 
While the latter trend has been reversed in 2007 and could prove to have been only 
temporary (see also Blais and Loewen, this issue), it highlights an important feature of 
the institutions of the Fifth Republic. While the two-round electoral system creates 
incentives for strategic voting, these may also encourage voters to support in the first 
round candidates with little chances of victory (Blais and Loewen, this issue). 
Consequently, the system does not reduce the number of parties fielding candidates as 
strongly as a purely majoritarian system, and allows new political formations to 
compete that have little chances of winning a seat in the Assemblée Nationale, let alone 
the presidency. The institutional setting, as well as the personalized nature of 
presidential contests, thus allows for the emergence of new parties, such as the Front 
National. As the electoral formula is still a majoritarian one, it remains difficult for 
challenger parties to succeed.  
Other institutional factors may also have facilitated the strengthening of the populist 
right, however. Elections using proportional representation take place at various levels, 
such as the municipalities and the regions, as well as in the elections for the European 
parliament. In fact, the Front National achieved its electoral breakthrough in a number 
of second-order elections in the early 1980s, first in a number of municipalities, and 
then in the 1984 European elections. Furthermore, the Socialist government changed 
the electoral system to proportional representation for the 1986 parliamentary elections 
so as to divide the right and prevent a victory of the RPR-UDF coalition, which is likely 
to have helped the Front National’s institutionalization in the French party system. 
However, despite substantially reduced chances of winning office when the two-round 
majoritarian system was reintroduced, the party’s voter share did not recede after 1988. 
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In this context, it is worth mentioning another feature of the French political system: 
When the president does not have a majority in parliament, and the system switches to 
cohabitation, it takes over certain traits of more consensual systems. In fact, the first 
occurrence of cohabitation in 1986 allowed the Front National took advantage of the 
possibility of portraying itself as the only ‘real’ opposition. 
To sum up, institutional features of the Fifth Republic, as well as parties’ strategic 
decisions, have provided a context in which the FN could reach significant electoral 
gains. However, it is of course not the institutions or parties’ strategies which ‘caused’ 
such transformations in the party system. Rather, the change that brought about the 
observed developments, we argue, is the process of globalisation and of European 
integration. The next section develops this hypothesis in more detail. Whereas 
Grunberg and Schweisguth’s (2003) analysis has revealed a tripartite structure of value 
orientations in France, we focus on how these values are anchored in a changing social 
structure as well as on the mobilization of these attitudes by political parties. In an 
analysis of the transformation of the political space, we then test the hypothesis that 
these processes have led to the rise of the Front National and to the emergence of a new 
cultural line of conflict in the French party system, resulting in a tripolar pattern of 
oppositions that closely resembles the attitudes of voters. 
 
New structural potentials and the emergence of an ‘Integration-Demarcation’ 
divide  
Globalisation can be conceived as a process of ‘denationalisation’ (Zürn 1998; 
Beisheim et al. 1999), as a transformation and weakening of national borders. These 
evolutions are not entirely new phenomena; there are earlier examples of phases of 
intense economic and cultural exchanges. However, such evolutions have accelerated in 
the last two or three decades and the ‘actual phase’ of globalisation surpasses both 
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quantitatively and qualitatively those of earlier epochs (Held et al. 1999: 425). Most 
important for understanding the potential impact of this process on national politics is to 
see that its influence on citizens is not homogeneous. Some segments of a national 
community benefit from new opportunities, while others have more to loose and 
perceive the changes associated with globalisation as a threat. Globalisation leads to 
new oppositions, new disparities, and to the formation of groups of potential ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’. These new oppositions result from at least three forms of competition: 
economic, cultural, and political (for a more detailed discussion, see Kriesi et al. 2006; 
2008). 
First, at the economic level, globalisation is linked with a growing pressure towards 
deregulation. This leads to an opposition between different sectors of a national 
economy. Firms and employees in sectors that have traditionally been ‘sheltered’ from 
international competition by protectionist measures are opposed to firms and employees 
who are mainly oriented towards international markets. The latter favour deregulation as 
the weakening of national borders is beneficial to their international competitivity, 
while it threatens the privileged position of the former on national markets. Second, 
immigration can be interpreted as an aspect of globalisation, which leads to a cultural 
opposition. Immigration and cultural diversity are perceived by some citizens as a threat 
to their national or cultural identity and to their standard of living and social status. 
Individuals’ education level is most important for understanding how they perceive 
immigration. Citizens with a low level of education are not only in a more direct 
competition with immigrants on the labour market, but they also usually have less 
tolerant, less multicultural values. Higher education, on the other hand, has a 
“liberalizing” effect, and is associated with universalistic values. Opposition against 
multicultural society can thereby be exploited by political actors to rally a broad 
counter-rebellion of lower skilled individuals against the libertarian and universalistic 
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values of the New Left. At the political level, finally, the most important evolution is 
clearly the process of European integration. The creation of a supra-national arena of 
decision-making and the increasing role of European-wide regulations is perceived as a 
loss by part of the citizens. Most important here is the degree of attachment to one’s 
national identity. Those who feel strongly bound to their national community should 
perceive a weakening of the state’s autonomy or sovereignty as a loss. Individuals with 
a more cosmopolite identity, by contrast, should be more favourable to this process – at 
least if it leads to the creation of a new system of regulation at the European level. 
Thus, the process of globalization leads to the formation of a new structural conflict, 
opposing those who benefit from this process to those who tend to loose in the course of 
the events. Generally, we expect ‘losers’ of the globalization process to seek to protect 
themselves through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on the maintenance 
of national boundaries and independence. ‘Winners’, by contrast, should support the 
opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. The 
emergence of social groups that have diverging interests due to their location in the 
social structure leads to political potentials for the politicization of a new antagonism 
between ‘integration’ and ‘demarcation’ by political actors. 
To the degree that established or new political parties articulate this new conflict by 
tying it to concrete political issues such as economic protectionism, opposition against 
immigration, or resistance against supranational integration, the structure of electoral 
competition will change and processes of realignment will be initiated. If parties try to 
mobilise segments of the electorate on the basis of issues linked with globalisation, we 
would expect the joint transformation of the main dimensions that structure the political 
space and of the configuration of party positions within this space. There are various 
scenarios how parties may mobilize the new political potentials, and the outcome will 
depend both on the strategic reaction of the established parties to the new issues as well 
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as on the strategic context created by the electoral system. Generally, we expect the 
division between integration and demarcation to be most pronounced where new right-
wing populist parties succeed in breaking into the party system or where established 
parties undergo a transformation that makes them virtually indistinguishable from 
parties of the populist right, as it has occurred in Switzerland and Austria. 
Furthermore, the “space” available for new conflicts is determined both by the strength 
of the existing cleavages, as well as by the relationship between old and new conflicts. 
How, then, does the new antagonism between integration and demarcation relate to the 
traditional conflicts that have characterized politics in Western Europe? In terms of 
economic policy making, the differing preferences between integration and demarcation 
have reinvigorated the established state-market divide. Because the winners and losers 
of globalization and of the strategy of economic liberalization pursued in the European 
Union differ from the social groups hitherto divided into a pro-market and a pro-state 
position, however, the social structural basis of this conflict has been transformed. 
Rather than the traditional class cleavage, which opposed the working class and the 
more well off classes, this conflict may today be more adequately labelled a state-
market cleavage, that cuts across these two groups. In terms of the cultural dimension of 
conflict in Western European party systems, which had traditionally been stamped by 
the religious cleavage, the redefinition of conflicts has been even more far-reaching, and 
has involved the emergence of new ideological conflicts. It has in fact been the waning 
of the religious cleavage that has opened the way for a two-fold transformation of 
political space and the emergence of a new cultural divide (Kriesi et al. 2008).  
The first transformation of the party political space has been triggered by the 
appropriation of the agenda of the new social movements of the left by New Left and 
Ecologist parties in the 1970s and 1980s, as Kitschelt (1994) has laid out. In the French 
case, the withering away of the religious cleavage is mirrored in the decline of the UDF 
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at the expense of the Gaullist RPR and (later) the Front National, which we have 
discussed in the preceding section. While class voting has not declined markedly, 
Knutsen (2004: 108-9) reveals a declining impact of the religious cleavage since the late 
1970s, which is a consequence of the demise of the communist and the Catholic 
subcultures. The long-term trend of secularization has hit the Communist party and the 
UDF especially hard. The shift in the balance of power within the left and the right 
blocks – from the Communists to the Socialists and from the non-Gaullist right to the 
RPR – can therefore be interpreted as concomitant to the transformation of the cultural 
divide. Both developments took shape between 1981 and 1984, where new political 
issues such as immigration, law and order and multiculturalism arose, resulting in a 
realignment that involved significant voter shifts between the established parties of the 
left and right, as well as in the breakthrough of the Front National (Martin 2000). Most 
research concurs in the assessment that the rise of the Front National is tied to the 
exclusionary conceptions of community and fears related to multicultural society, as 
well as a counter-revolution to the New Left (e.g., Perrineau 1997, Mayer 2002, Ignazi 
2003, Betz 2004). While the party is most firmly anchored in the working class, recent 
analyses have shown that the preservation and defence of the traditional national 
community, coupled with a deep distrust of the established political parties, is much 
more important than economic grievances in triggering the right-wing populist vote in 
France and elsewhere (Oesch 2008). Whereas Kitschelt (1995) had argued that the Front 
National also thrived on neo-liberal sentiments in the 1980s, these have largely lost their 
relevance since the party has become strongly anchored in the working class 
(Bornschier 2008a). In the late 1980s and the 1990s, we thus expect a second 
transformation of political space to have occurred, this time driven by the successful 
mobilization of cultural issues by the extreme populist right. The next section presents 
an empirical analysis of this transformation process.  
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The transformation of the French political space 
We analyse the transformation of the French political space by examining parties’ issue 
positions during national electoral campaigns, and then determining the broader 
dimensions that underlie parties’ policy-statements. National campaigns constitute a 
crucial moment for observing changes in electoral alignments (Martin 2000). These 
periods of intense political debate offer unique opportunities to see how parties and 
candidates respond to new issues, voters’ demands, and to the strategies of the other 
contenders. Our analysis focuses on four elections: the 1978 legislative election and the 
1988, 1995, and 2002 presidential races. We include several recent elections, as we 
expect the realignment process linked with the integration of new issues and the 
mobilization of the new potentials to unfold gradually, rather than abruptly during a 
single campaign. By also considering an election from the 1970s, we add a reference 
point to make comparisons over a longer period of time.3 In order to investigate the 
discourse of parties and candidates during these campaigns, we performed a content 
analysis of all articles related to the electoral campaign or to national politics, published 
during the two months preceding the election in a quality newspaper (Le Monde) and in 
a popular newspaper (Le Parisien). In this analysis, we coded the direction of all 
relationships between political actors (parties and candidates) and political issues, using 
a five-point scale ranging from –1 to +1.4 For the purpose of this analysis, these issues 
are grouped into eleven general categories. These include economic issues (support for 
the welfare state, budgetary rigor, economic liberalism), cultural issues (cultural 
liberalism, European integration, culture and education, restrictive immigration policy, 
national defence, law and order), as well as a few additional categories (environmental 
protection, institutional reforms).5 This means that we have data on the average 
positions of parties and candidates regarding these various issues, as well as on the 
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frequency with which each actor addressed (or was brought in relation with) a given 
topic during the campaign.6 The number of issues for which we have information, 
however, varies across parties and elections. Some issues were addressed only in part of 
the campaigns and not all parties took position on all issue categories.7 
This data provides central information that allows us to determine how the political 
space is structured and which positions parties take in this space. Our aim is thus to 
determine how many dimensions are needed to provide a satisfactory representation of 
the positions of parties and issues. We rely for this on multidimensional scaling, a 
statistical method that makes possible a graphical representation of the positions of 
objects in a space, based on information regarding the distances or dissimilarities 
between these objects (Kruskal and Wish 1978; Borg and Groenen 1997).8 The 
corresponding results are presented in Figure 3.  
Each of the panels shows the configuration of issue and party positions for one election. 
In order to highlight what the main results relevant for our research question are, we 
have connected the issues categories that we interpret as the poles of the economic and 
cultural dimensions, respectively.9 These axes are not part of the solution, but are 
simply added in order to facilitate to some extent the interpretation of the results. 
Consequently, these dimensions may be more or less integrated, depending on the way 
parties combine their position regarding economic and cultural issues. 
It should be pointed out that due to our restricted focus on the supply side of politics, we 
do not study cleavages directly in this article, which would require the inclusion of 
demand-side data to determine the social structural underpinnings of voter alignments, 
according to Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) acclaimed definition. The dimensions 
underlying parties’ programmatic positions that we focus on represent the political 
manifestation or the ideological component of the underlying cleavages. 
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‘Figure 3 about here’ 
 
In all four elections, we find that the appropriate representation of the political space is 
two-dimensional.10 Welfare as opposed to economic liberalism invariably emerges as 
one dimension of conflict, corresponding to the traditional state-market cleavage. At the 
same time, we witness a transformation of the cultural dimension, i.e. its ideological 
content evolves between 1978 and 1988. In 1978, this dimension is formed by cultural 
liberalism and budgetary rigor, which can be interpreted as a divide between the 
progressive position of the New Left on the one hand, and a neo-conservative position 
on the other hand. The latter is liberal in economic terms, but traditionalist in cultural 
matters (Habermas 1985; Eatwell 1989). From 1988 on, then, immigration forms the 
counter-pole to cultural liberalism on what can now be interpreted as an integration-
demarcation divide. Despite the somewhat unusual relationship between the economic 
and cultural dimensions in 1995, this opposition, and thus the structure of political 
space, is remarkably stable. In other words, while the two dimensions are more strongly 
related in 1988 and 1995 than in 2002, the nature of the two dimensions as well as the 
basic two-dimensional structure represent lasting features after the transformation of 
the cultural dimension. 
Turning to the positions of the parties in this political space, they are characteristic of 
the situation after the rise of New Left issues in 1978. We observe a differentiation 
between the Socialist New Left and the Old Left position of the communist PC. The 
Socialist party is both strongly in favour of the universalistic values that characterize 
the cultural liberalism of the New Social Movements of the 1970s, as well as solidly 
leftist in economic terms. The Communists, on the other hand, endorse welfare policies 
and staunchly oppose economic liberalism, while their distance to cultural liberalism 
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indicates that their position regarding the cultural dimension is more ambiguous than 
that of the PS.  
The main transformation in the period under study, however, takes place on the 
political right, resulting in a reconfiguration of the structure of oppositions within the 
party system. As already discussed, this evolution began in the 1970s, when Jacques 
Chirac re-launched the Gaullist party and developed a culturally protectionist and Euro-
sceptic discourse that helped it outflank the centrist UDF. In the 1978 election, the 
Gaullist RPR has a rather classical neo-conservative profile. It defends traditionalist 
values against the culturally liberalist pull of the PS and combines this with a decided 
advocacy of budgetary rigour. The UDF, on the other hand, lies halfway between the 
left and the right, both in economic, as well as in cultural terms. Although the Front 
National stood in this election, it was not sufficiently present in the media to determine 
its position. In 1978, it is clearly the RPR that is located at the extreme of the cultural 
dimension. 
The second transformation of the political space, triggered by the emergence of the 
immigration issue and the subsequent rise of the Front National, occurred early in 
France, from a comparative perspective (Kriesi et al. 2008). In the wake of the left’s 
victory in the late 1970s, which in 1981 gained power for the first time in the Fifth 
Republic, the RPR and UDF pushed a radicalization of political discourse by putting 
the immigration issue on the political agenda. Their plan to repatriate immigrants 
provoked a counter-mobilization of the unions and the non-communist left, as well as 
by parts of the right, leading the government to abandon the plan (Martin 2000: 256ff.). 
And the established right played with ideological polarization again after it found itself 
in opposition after 1981. When the Socialist government under Mitterrand decided to 
regularize illicit immigrants and abandon the death penalty, the right reacted promptly 
and radicalized its discourse. On the other hand, the Socialist left promoted anti-racism 
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as a central issue to fill its ideological void, defending a multiculturalist “recognition of 
difference” (Perrineau 1997: 49-50).  
Ten years later, in the 1988 election, the RPR has moved to the centre and the Front 
National has taken its place at the demarcation pole of the now transformed cultural 
dimension. Opposing the cultural liberalism of the left and advocating an exclusionary 
conception of community in opposition to immigrants, the populist right occupies a 
distinct political space. While the populist right is also located near to the law and order 
stances comprised in the ‘security’ category, this is not what sets it apart from the 
moderate right.  
On the other hand, there has been a convergence regarding the cultural dimension both 
within the established left, as well as within the established right. Since the RPR has 
tempered its culturally protectionist stance, its position now more or less corresponds to 
that of the UDF in cultural terms. On the political left, the difference that was visible 
between PC and PS in 1978 almost vanishes after the transformation of the cultural 
dimension and the emergence of the integration-demarcation divide.  
Upon closer inspection, however, an additional divide between the Communists and the 
Socialists is revealed. What makes the difference in their positions in the 1988 and 
1995 campaigns is their strongly diverging stance regarding European integration (see 
also the issue positions in the Table A.1). While the PS is very strongly in favour of the 
integration project, the PC opposes it decidedly. The RPR, in the 1970s critical of 
European integration, has largely converged with the UDF on a pro-integrationist 
position. With the Front National taking a strongly critical stance towards the EU, the 
political space of the 1995 presidential election thus confirms the hypothesis of a rift 
within both the left and the right caused by the integration issue.11 The two lines run 
between the Communist and the Socialist left on the one hand, and the established and 
the populist right on the other. 
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Apart from the additional discordance between the Communists and the Socialists 
concerning the EU, the main components of the moderate left and right blocks differ 
mainly in their positions regarding the state-market cleavage. The Socialists are more 
liberal in economic terms than the Communists, while the UDF is more centrist than the 
RPR. It is interesting to note that the candidates of the radical or extreme left do not 
differ markedly from the Communists in their position. In this sense, the emergence of 
these actors in the 1988 campaign seems to owe a lot to the loss of credibility of the 
Communists’ staunchly protectionist propositions in the light of their participation in 
governments led by the Socialists in the 1980s, a hypothesis also put forward by 
Grunberg (2006: 234). The radical left’s refusal to join governments led by the 
Socialists and Communists makes them predisposed for a protest vote against the 
established left. 
As far as the established right is concerned, Chirac led the Gaullist party into more 
economically protectionist grounds in the 1995 election. Along with a stronger 
correlation between the economic and the cultural dimensions, this explains the unusual 
configuration in that contest. The – albeit limited – convergence along the economic 
dimension may well have rendered the cultural antagonism more salient. Although the 
Front National leans more towards economic liberalism than to the defence of the 
welfare state, it seems rather ill suited to mobilize along economically liberal lines. As 
compared to the strongly neo-liberal party program launched in 1985, the Front 
National cultivated a less clear-cut position already in the 1988 election campaign. 
This, together with the meager showing of Alain Madelin, candidate of the 
economically liberal Démocratie Libérale in the 2002 elections, underscores that the 
economically liberalist potential remains quite limited in France, and is unlikely to 
contribute to the success of the Front National, as Kitschelt (1995) had suggested.  
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As far as the established right’s strategy towards the right-wing populist challenger is 
concerned, these have shown quite a degree of variation, as a close look at parties’ issue 
positions (see Table A.1) suggests. From 1988 on, the established right has tempted to 
win back some of the voters it had lost to the Front National’s by issuing proposals 
against immigration. As a consequence, the main difference between the Front National 
and the RPR and UDF is that they approve cultural liberalism, and not so much their 
attitude regarding immigration. The configuration of the 2002 campaign then shows a 
shift in the strategy of the established right vis-à-vis the Front National.12 Departing 
from their accommodating stances with regard to the immigration issue, they have 
switched to an adversarial strategy. Both the RPR (now UMP), as well as the remaining 
parts of the UDF reject tough integration policies. As a result, the structure of 
competition becomes more clearly two-dimensional again, and presents a triangular 
configuration of party alternatives: The parties of the established left and right 
primarily diverge in their postulations concerning economic policies and not regarding 
the cultural divide. As a consequence, the Front National now alone advocates cultural 
protectionism and differentialism. This change in the strategy of the mainstream parties 
of the right is accompanied by an attempt at co-opting the security issue. In the 2002 
election, not only the RPR and UDF, but also the PS and PC outflank the Front 
National in their stipulation of law and order (see Table A.1). But while the parties of 
the left still lay by far the strongest emphasis on welfare issues, security becomes one 
of the prime questions addressed by the established right, following the Front 
National’s intense treatment of the issue.  
By and large, then, the new structural potentials caused by denationalization have been 
assimilated into the conflicts resulting from the more general process of economic and 
cultural modernization since the late 1960s. Either they have been framed by political 
parties in terms of the old antagonism between state and market, or by new ideologies 
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that have emerged in Western societies in the past decades (Bornschier 2005). In the 
1970s, the conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values has gained prominence 
as a result of its politicization by parties of the New Left. As the avant-garde of the new 
right-wing populist party family, the French Front National succeeded in developing 
what may be called a traditionalist-communitarian counter-ideology to the universalism 
that is embodied in the cultural liberalism of the New Left, and proved capable of 
mobilizing broader masses of citizens since the late 1980s. Earlier than elsewhere, the 
Front National has adopted a discourse of ‘cultural differentialism’ or ‘ethnopluralism’, 
that does not claim the superiority of any nationality or race, but rather the right of 
peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions (Antonio 2000; Betz 2004). The presence 
of immigrants as well as the processes of globalization and European integration 
endanger these cultural traditions, and are thus seen as threatening. 
More directly than in conflicts over cultural liberalism and immigration, the antagonism 
between integration and demarcation has been reflected in the issue of European 
integration. On the political right, scepticism towards European integration has a long 
tradition due to a heavy emphasis on national sovereignty going back to Charles de 
Gaulle, who boycotted the Council of Ministers between 1965 and 1966. When the RPR 
reversed its Eurosceptic stance in the 1984 elections for the European parliament, the 
only party to remain sceptic of the integration process were the Communists, which 
were already in precipitous decline. In the same 1984 election, the Front National 
achieved its electoral breakthrough with a list led by Le Pen and entitled ‘Liste Front 
d’opposition nationale pour l’Europe des patries’, which scored 11% of the votes. 
While this has not been part of their core ideology, right-wing populist parties across 
Western Europe have adopted an Eurosceptic stance in the 1990s.13 They have thereby 
integrated the issue of European integration into their traditionalist-communitarian 
ideology of demarcation. At the same time, parties of the extreme left oppose the 
 21
European project for its liberalizing thrust in the economic domain. Consequently, 
cultural and economically based forms of Euroscepticism are both conceptually, as well 
as empirically distinct (Evans 2000; Bornschier 2008b). In the French case, it can be 
shown that economic Euroscepticism forms part of the state-market cleavage at the 
voter level, while cultural fears related to European integration form part of the cultural 
divide structuring voter attitudes (Bornschier 2008a). Attitudes towards the integration 
process have introduced a divide both within the left, as well as within the right. Put in 
evidence for the first time in analyses of the referendum on the Maastricht treaty, the 
European issue crosscuts alignments based on the traditional economic divide 
(Perrineau 1996).  
 
 
Conclusion 
Summing up, the significant developments resulting in a transformation of political 
space and the rise of the Front National can be summarized under three broad headings:  
(1) Between 1978 and 1988, we witness a transformation of the cultural divide. 
Originally characterized by an opposition between cultural liberalism and neo-
conservatism, a new demarcation pole has emerged, which combines culturally 
protectionist and exclusionist stances. This is in line with our hypothesis that the issues 
pertaining to the integration-demarcation divide are integrated into the already existing 
cultural divide. In the course of this transformation, the RPR’s programmatic profile 
has evolved from a culturally protectionist and nationalist orientation to an acceptance 
of cultural liberalism, levelling out the differences between itself and the centrist UDF. 
The RPR thereby left unoccupied a political space that provided fertile ground for the 
right-wing populist challenger, resulting in a reconfiguration of the party system. 
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In the forefront of the 2002 presidential elections, large parts of the remaining UDF 
then joined together with the RPR to form the UMP, first standing for ‘Union pour une 
majorité présidentielle’, then rebapticized ‘Union pour un mouvement populaire’ after 
the election. In part, this can be attributed to a long-term convergence in programmatic 
profile. But it also means that the parties of the right reacted more quickly than the left 
to the challenge posed by party system fragmentation under the two-round majoritarian 
formula (Grunberg 2006). 
 (2) Regarding the strategies of the mainstream parties, the established right 
consecutively reacted by attempts to challenge the Front National’s ownership of the 
immigration question. However, this strategy proved ineffective in pre-empting the 
Front National’s success, built on the apparently more coherent combination of cultural 
protectionism and anti-immigrant stances. Between 1995 and 2007, the established 
right has changed its position regarding the immigration issue repeatedly. From an 
attempt at accommodating the Front National’s prime concern, both RPR and UDF 
switched to an adversarial strategy, distancing themselves from the exclusionist stances 
of their challenger. This may well have contributed to Le Pen’s unprecedented success 
in the 2002 presidential elections.  
France is therefore clearly a case that corroborates Ignazi’s (1992; 2003) claim that the 
established parties of the right pushed a ideological polarization that right-wing populist 
parties later thrived on when the moderate right moved back to the centre. However, as 
this analysis has also made clear, the strategies of parties at the opposing pole of a 
political divide also impinge heavily on the success of challenging parties (Meguid 
2005; Kriesi 2008). Early on, the Socialists have contributed to the success of the Front 
National by abandoning New Left positions and instead taking up the defence of 
multiculturalism, facilitating the populist right’s redefinition of the main dimensions of 
opposition.  
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(3) Finally, between 1988 and 1995, the question of European integration emerged as a 
political issue. While the left had always been divided between a Europhile PS and a 
Euro-sceptic PC, the reorientation of the Front National introduced a similar rift within 
the right. After the Gaullist RPR had abandoned its nationalist position early on in the 
1984 European elections, opposition against supranational integration thrived in the 
sovereignist political space from the beginning of the 1990s on. While the question 
produced various scissions within the established right, it also led the Front National to 
revert its originally integration-friendly position and staunchly oppose the project. 
 
In sum, our analysis of party positions has revealed a tripartite structure of oppositions, 
as suggested by Grunberg and Schweisguth (2003) in their analysis of voter attitudes, 
and called into question by Andersen and Evans (2003). In the 2007 election, however, 
Nicolas Sarkozy has changed the strategy of the established right vis-à-vis its right-
wing populist challenger yet again. As a consequence of his rapprochement to the 
positions of the Front National, parts of the right-wing populist electorate have 
abandoned Le Pen and voted for the candidate with the better chances of enacting his 
political program, as Mayer (2007) has shown. In that election, Le Pen’s support base 
declined substantially, as we have seen earlier on. This raises the question of how the 
new strategy of the UMP will affect the pattern of electoral competition in the next 
elections. Could we observe a return to bipolar multipartism? It is difficult to tell with 
certainty as it depends largely on the future strategic moves of parties, on the right and 
on the left. While the UMP has returned to a more radical position on cultural issues, it 
has only closed part of the gap that separated it from the FN. There is thus probably still 
a strong electoral potential for culturally more conservative positions, which the FN or 
another party could continue to mobilize in the future. This will also be more likely if 
the UMP pushes further an agenda of economic liberalization, which may alienate part 
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of the culturally conservative voters. Such developments would then bring the French 
party system back to a tripolar configuration.  
At the same time, a new configuration could result from changes among left-wing 
parties. We have observed more intense divergences between the PS and the PC on the 
economic consequences of European integration, which may become more 
consequential as the saliency of this issue rises. The gap within the left could further 
widen, especially if the PS moderates its economic positions. Several prominent party 
members have called for such a ‘modernization’ of the party positions, after the 
electoral defeat of Ségolène Royal. If the PS follows such a course, it may loose part of 
its current voters to more radical left-wing parties, eventually bringing about a new 
configuration of party positions. 
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1 This paper is a product of a larger research project on the national political 
consequences of globalization in West European countries. The theoretical arguments 
advanced here are discussed in more detail in Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008). For the case of 
France, see in particular Bornschier (2008a). 
2 The results of the 1958 presidential election are not presented, as it was an indirect 
election, by an electoral college. De Gaulle won by a landslide, with 79 percent of the 
vote, against 13 percent for the candidate of the PC and 8 percent for the candidate of 
the non-communist left. 
3 The data we rely on was collected in the framework of a research project investigating 
the national political consequences of globalization in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 
2006; 2008). The decision to focus on a legislative election in the 1970s, rather than on 
the 1974 presidential election, for instance, was driven by reasons of data availability. 
One of the aims of the project from which the data come is to compare changes at the 
levels of parties to changes at the level of voters. Unfortunately, no election survey was 
conducted after the presidential elections in the 1970s in France. 
4 This method was developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (Kleinnijenhuis et 
al. 1997; Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings, 2001). Most relationships were coded as either 
positive (+1) or negative (–1). Neutral relationships (i.e., a value of 0) were relatively 
rare, and the intermediary categories (–0.5 and +0.5) were used only for statements 
where the party position is conditional or explicitly uncertain. 
5 For a more detailed presentation of these categories, see Kriesi et al. (2006), or 
Dolezal (2008). 
6 Tables with the average issue positions and issue salience by party can be found in the 
appendix. 
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7 The number of observations by party and campaign, as well as the distribution of these 
across issue categories, can be found in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
8 To be more precise, the analyses were performed with weighted metric 
multidimensional scaling, where the party × issue pairs were weighted for their salience 
during the campaign. More details on the method used can be found in Dolezal (2008) 
and Lachat (2008). 
9 In order to facilitate cross-election comparisons, the solutions presented in Figure 3 
were rotated, so that the opposition between welfare and economic liberalism 
corresponds to the horizontal axis. This has no impact on the substantial conclusions 
that can be drawn from these solutions. 
10 By representing issues and parties in a lower dimensional space, multidimensional 
scaling inevitably distorts the original distances among these pairs of objects. This 
degree of distortion is indicated by the ‘Stress-1’ statistic. The optimal number of 
dimensions required to represent the political space is determined by looking at how a 
change in the number of dimensions affects the value of Stress-1. We find here two-
dimensional representations, meaning that adding a third dimension would only 
marginally reduce the value of this statistic. 
11 In 1988, we find however that the FN took a pro-European position. This may seem 
surprising. But this issue had a very low salience for the FN in the 1988 campaign: We 
found indeed a single newspaper article where the FN addressed the European question, 
though in positive terms. Given the weighting procedure used for the statistical 
analyses, however, this small number of observations has almost no impact on the 
positioning of the FN or of the European issue in the solution of Figure 3. 
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12 Due to its limited presence in the media, the position of Mégret’s Mouvement 
National Républicain, which split from the Front National in 1998, could not be 
determined in the 2002 election. 
13 Comparative data supporting this claim is presented in Kriesi et al. (2006; 2008). See 
Perrineau (1997) for a detailed analysis of the French case and Bornschier (2008b) for a 
comparative analysis of right-wing populist voters. 
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‘Table A.1 about here’ 
 
‘Table A.2 about here’ 
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Figure 1: Score of five major parties at legislative elections, 1958–2007 
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Figure 2: Score of five major parties at presidential elections, 1965–2007 
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Figure 3: The structure of the French political space, 1978–2002 
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Table A.1: Issue positions by party and campaign: average direction of the coded sentences for the twelve categories of issues 
 
Welfare Budget 
Economic 
liberalism 
Cultural 
liberalism Europe Culture 
Anti-
immig. Army Security 
Envi-
ronment 
Instit. 
reform 
Radical left            
1988 1.00 -1.00 -0.85 1.00 – 1.00 1.00 – 1.00 – 1.00 
2002 1.00 0.25 -1.00 – – – -1.00 – -0.33 – 0.33 
PC            
1978 0.94 -0.44 -0.94 0.46 – 0.82 – – 1.00 -1.00 0.82 
1988 0.91 -0.75 -1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.80 – 0.20 – 0.92 
1995 0.75 -1.00 -0.94 0.83 -0.50 1.00 -0.50 -1.00 1.00 – 0.57 
2002 1.00 0.33 -0.87 0.60 – 0.60 -1.00 – 1.00 – -1.00 
PS            
1978 0.71 -0.35 -0.86 0.76 – 0.46 – – 0.80 1.00 0.58 
1988 0.72 0.21 -0.48 0.98 1.00 1.00 -0.46 – 0.29 – 0.49 
1995 0.78 -0.10 -0.86 0.75 0.95 0.94 -0.44 -0.58 0.71 – 0.46 
2002 0.63 0.34 -0.67 0.46 – 1.00 -1.00 – 0.92 – 0.65 
Greens            
2002 0.88 -0.25 -1.00 0.43 – 1.00 -1.00 – -0.14 – -0.27 
MRG            
1978 0.77 0.17 -0.58 0.20 – 0.50 – – 1.00 0.67 0.94 
1995 0.56 0.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 – -1.00 1.00 – – 1.00 
UDF            
1978 0.23 0.84 -0.37 0.07 – 1.00 – – 0.92 0.61 0.64 
1988 0.16 0.87 0.30 0.82 1.00 0.94 0.78 – 0.76 – 0.84 
1995 -0.33 1.00 -0.71 1.00 0.56 – 1.00 – 1.00 – 0.75 
2002 -0.22 0.64 -0.28 0.40 – 1.00 -1.00 – 1.00 – 0.71 
RPR            
1978 -0.05 0.85 -0.04 -0.72 – 1.00 – – 1.00 0.33 0.04 
1988 0.20 1.00 0.32 0.12 0.91 0.85 0.56 – 0.72 – 0.09 
1995 0.24 0.60 -0.47 0.26 0.59 0.90 0.76 0.55 1.00 – 0.45 
2002 0.05 0.94 0.21 0.43 – 1.00 -0.85 – 0.96 – 0.00 
De Villiers            
1995 -0.14 1.00 -0.33 -1.00 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 – 1.00 
FN            
1988 -0.05 0.88 -0.71 -0.79 1.00 -0.14 1.00 – 1.00 – 0.73 
1995 0.29 0.75 0.00 -0.69 -1.00 -1.00 0.68 0.79 1.00 – 0.64 
2002 -0.13 1.00 0.41 -0.71 – 0.71 0.83 – 0.77 – 0.80 
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Table A.2: Issue salience by party and campaign: frequency (in %) with which a party addressed issues of a given category during each campaign and number of observations for 
each party (N and percentage of the corresponding election). 
 Welfare Budget 
Econ. 
lib. 
Cultural 
lib. Europe Culture 
Anti-
immig. Army Security 
Envi-
ronment 
Instit. 
reform N 
% of 
election
Radical left              
1988 52.1 2.1 27.1 6.3 – 4.2 2.1 – 2.1 – 4.2 48 2.4 
2002 36.1 13.1 34.4 – – – 1.6 – 4.9 – 9.8 61 5.9 
PC              
1978 27.7 11.1 28.5 17.4 – 4.7 – – 0.9 0.4 9.4 235 16.6 
1988 38.2 4.8 17.0 9.1 4.2 7.9 12.1 – 3.0 – 3.6 165 8.3 
1995 22.2 1.9 28.7 11.1 3.7 7.4 3.7 5.6 2.8 – 13.0 108 6.0 
2002 43.2 8.1 20.3 6.8 – 6.8 8.1 – 4.1 – 2.7 74 7.2 
PS              
1978 34.5 10.2 24.8 10.6 – 4.3 – – 3.1 0.9 11.5 322 22.7 
1988 23.4 4.2 19.2 12.5 8.7 15.4 6.3 – 3.8 – 6.6 745 37.7 
1995 27.7 3.3 22.3 6.6 6.1 5.2 5.0 3.0 5.3 – 15.5 638 35.5 
2002 31.1 13.2 12.6 10.8 – 7.8 4.5 – 15.0 – 5.1 334 32.3 
Greens              
2002 20.2 7.1 16.7 8.3 – 9.5 3.6 – 21.4 – 13.1 84 8.1 
MRG              
1978 26.3 4.7 34.2 7.9 – 6.3 – – 1.1 3.2 16.3 190 13.4 
1995 23.1 10.3 20.5 15.4 7.7 – 15.4 2.6 – – 5.1 39 2.2 
UDF              
1978 20.0 5.5 23.0 17.3 – 5.5 – – 5.7 10.1 12.9 456 32.2 
1988 19.1 9.4 18.8 6.1 8.0 18.5 2.5 – 9.9 – 7.7 362 18.3 
1995 8.6 8.6 20.0 11.4 22.9 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 22.9 35 1.9 
2002 20.7 12.6 18.4 11.5 – 4.6 8.0 – 16.1 – 8.0 87 8.4 
RPR              
1978 29.3 9.3 21.4 17.2 – 4.7 – – 6.0 1.4 10.7 215 15.2 
1988 21.1 3.4 19.4 11.2 4.6 8.2 13.3 – 11.8 – 7.2 475 24.0 
1995 20.8 10.9 20.1 7.0 9.8 6.3 2.1 3.9 4.4 – 14.7 816 45.4 
2002 20.1 11.7 18.2 7.7 – 4.0 4.7 – 17.9 – 15.7 274 26.5 
De Villiers              
1995 15.2 6.5 13.0 6.5 17.4 2.2 8.7 6.5 13.0 – 10.9 46 2.6 
FN              
1988 10.4 7.1 3.8 11.5 2.7 3.8 33.9 – 14.8 – 12.0 183 9.3 
1995 12.3 7.0 11.4 15.8 8.8 1.8 21.9 6.1 5.3 – 9.6 114 6.3 
2002 13.4 4.2 14.3 11.8 – 5.9 20.2 – 21.8 – 8.4 119 11.5 
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